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Abstract 
No subject matter comes closer to modeling Deweyan philosophy 
than the modern social studies. Yet, social studies scholars have been 
debating for decades whether Dewey actually supported the curriculum 
resulting in a perceived paradox between Dewey’s interdisciplinary approach 
to problem solving and his writings about traditional, stand-alone social 
sciences. This paper situates the problem in Dewey’s Theory of Nature and 
argues that (1) the paradox is a myth; (2) Dewey is misunderstood and 
marginalized in the literature; and (3) Dewey offers a middle position for 
addressing problems and supporting social studies learning with myriad 
theories. 
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Introduction 
 It was no accident that the Pragmatism branch of philosophy emerged 
around the 1870s, about the same time as the social welfare crusades, which 
were the precursors to the modern social studies movement (Saxe, 1992). 
Both were strong reactions to the social tumult of the late nineteenth century 
Industrial Revolution. Although the term, Pragmatism, first appeared around 
the turn of the century (James, 1898), this particular offshoot of philosophy 
was well established by then, and John Dewey rose to prominence as one of 
the most influential philosophers in American history with his unique 
synthesis of it, which he later labeled “Instrumentalism” (Dewey, 1929, p. 
151). 
 Although Dewey’s system of ideas saturated the deliberations and 
final report of the Committee for Social Studies in 1916, he was not a 
participant nor did he ever offer a resounding endorsement for the 
Committee’s recommendations (Evans, 2004; Fallace, 2009; Lybarger, 1983; 
Mraz, 2004; Saxe, 1992). Despite his absence, Dewey’s influence was 
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enormous and as Saxe (1992) asserted, “[C]learly, no part of the school 
curriculum (past or present) appeared as close to Deweyan thought as social 
studies” (p. 266). Further, evidence from the proceedings suggested that 
Dewey’s philosophy and theories played a role in bridging the participants’ 
differences. The compromise document coalesced around two major themes, 
centering the proposed curriculum around present needs and problems; and 
developing aims for improving society (Fallace, 2009).  
 Deweyan philosophy served as both method (i.e., bridging 
differences among competing factions) and content (i.e., focusing on present 
problems and aims) for what would become the modern social studies 
curriculum in the late 1930s. At the same time, the public record only 
contained two clear instances when Dewey commented about the nascent 
curriculum. On the surface, the pronouncements offered ambiguous support, 
which has led to much consternation and misinterpretation about a paradox 
between a philosophy built on an interdisciplinary approach to problem 
solving versus emphases on the stand-alone significance of history and 
geography in some of his major writings (Fallace, 2009; Saxe, 1992; Stanley 
& Stanley, 1977). The purpose of this paper is to situate the social studies 
curriculum in Dewey’s Theory of Nature using his philosophy as a tool to 
resolve the paradox. The resolution will reveal that Dewey offers a middle 
position where (1) the problem is illogical, and therefore, the paradox is 
nonexistent; (2) Dewey is marginalized and broadly misunderstood in the 
social studies literature; and (3) the field is missing out on a source of 
philosophy and multiple theories to enhance learning.  
 
The Great American Philosopher 
 John Dewey rose from humble origins to become one of the most 
prolific philosophers of the modern age. He was born on October 20, 1859 in 
Burlington, Vermont living to the ripe old age of 92 years before passing 
away in New York City on June 1, 1952. His birth also marked the 
publication year of some of the great intellectual works of modern times 
including Marx’s Critique of Political Economy, John Stuart Mill’s On 
Liberty and Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species. While all of these works 
had a profound influence on the young Dewey, Darwin’s evolutionary 
theories and scientific discoveries formed the foundation for Dewey’s 
Pragmatism, essentially undergirding his Theory of Nature (Dykhuizen, 
1959; Westbrook, 1991). 
 Dewey began his college studies at 15 years of age when he enrolled 
at the University of Vermont where the faculty exposed him to radical 
philosophical ideas. Following graduation, he taught high school in 
Pennsylvania for a couple years and then headed to graduate school at Johns 
Hopkins University where he studied philosophy. One of his professors was 
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Charles Peirce, a founder of Pragmatism thought. In 1884, the university 
awarded Dewey a doctorate degree (Dykhuizen, 1959). 
 Armed with his new credentials, Dewey migrated to the Midwestern, 
United States where he served in three university faculty positions over the 
next 20 years. First, he received an appointment at the University of 
Michigan (1884-1888), followed by the University of Minnesota (1888-
1894), and then lastly at the University of Chicago (1894-1904). In Chicago, 
Dewey established the Laboratory School where he was able to implement 
many of his philosophical and theoretical innovations including child-
centered instruction based on manual activities and the cultivation of student 
interests. The Laboratory School approach stood in stark contrast to the 
predominant modes of teaching in American schools characterized by rote 
memorization and recitation. Further, Dewey’s experimental approaches 
contributed to his first education-focused books, School and Society (1899), 
How We Think (1910), and Democracy and Education (1916)  
(Tanner, 1997). 
  After accepting a dual appointment at Columbia University and 
Teachers College, Dewey returned to the East Coast in 1904. As his 
academic star continued to rise, he engaged in nearly nonstop, intense 
scholarship while organizations aggressively solicited his speeches. For over 
71 years he wrote extensively beyond philosophy and education to include 
topics such as war, immigration, politics, and many other contemporary 
issues. Remarkably, he produced over 1,000 publications including 40 
books, 140 journal articles, and many essays and speeches (Boydston, 
1992/1993).  
 Dewey’s works were the living embodiment of his philosophy where 
he articulated problems, devised solutions, and then tested those solutions in 
experience. Because the vast scope of his work was also deep and complex, 
the compilers forsook a thematic approach and opted for a chronological one 
(Boydston, 1992/1993). Boisvert (1988) divided the Dewey compendium 
into three phases each lasting about 20 years: the idealistic phase (1882-
1903), the experimental phase (1904-1924), and the naturalistic phase 
(1925-1953), which included the posthumous publications of items he 
produced to nearly his passing. For purposes of the present manuscript I will 
primarily be focusing on Democracy and Education (1916) from the 
experimental phase, and Experience and Nature (1925) from the naturalistic 
one. Of Dewey’s major works, these two capture both his Theory of Nature 
as well as his most extensive treatment of philosophy and school subject 
matter. 
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Dewey and the New Social Studies Curriculum 
 Perhaps because schools were implementing the new social studies 
curriculum, Dewey finally offered public comment in the late 1930s about 
the new subject area, first in a speech, and then later in a journal article. 
Speaking before the Eastern State Regional Conference of the Progressive 
Education Association in November 1936 during the depths of the Great 
Depression, he admonished officials and administrators to reform school 
relationships. Citing the rise of totalitarian regimes around the world, he 
advocated for a democratic approach to teaching and learning particularly in 
the areas of methods, content, and school relationships with the broader 
society. He described a curriculum where students analyzed social problems 
and synthesized solutions. Within this context, he first mentioned the nascent 
social studies, 
It certainly seems as if the social studies have a more intimate 
relation with social life than a great many of the other subjects that 
are taught in the school, and that accordingly their increasing 
introduction into the curriculum, the increasing emphasis upon them 
ought to be a means by which the school system meets the challenge 
of democracy.  
But the crucial question is the extent to which the material of the 
social studies, whether economics or politics or history or sociology, 
whatever it may be, is taught simply as information about present 
society or is taught in connection with things that are done, that need 
to be done, and how to do them. If the first tendency prevails, I can 
readily imagine that the introduction of more and more social studies 
into the curriculum will simply put one more load onto a curriculum 
that is already overburdened, and that the supposed end for which 
they were introduced—the development of a more intelligent 
citizenship in all the ranges of citizenship (the complex ranges that 
now exist, including political but including also much more) will be 
missed. (Dewey, 2008, p. 185) 
 Nearly one and one-half years later in May 1938, Progressive 
Education published a Dewey manuscript entitled, “What is social study?” In 
the article, Dewey again returned to the theme about all school subjects 
needing a social focus and whether the social studies was truly necessary, 
The problem of congestion of studies and diversion of aims with 
resulting superficiality is a pressing one today…[I]n the end 
emphasis upon social studies as a separate line of study may only add 
to the confusion and dispersion that now exist! Not because they are 
not important, but precisely because they are so important that they 
should give direction and organization to all branches of study. 
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In conclusion…Social studies as an isolated affair are likely to 
become either accumulations of bodies of special factual information 
or, in the hands of zealous teachers, to be organs of indoctrination in 
the sense of propaganda for a special social end, accepted 
enthusiastically, perhaps, but still dogmatically. (Dewey, 1946, p. 
183) 
As far as the public record was concerned, these were the only two times that 
Dewey actually addressed the social studies curriculum, and on the surface, 
he neither fully embraced nor rejected it. 
 Today, Dewey’s seeming ambivalence toward the social studies 
curriculum has produced a major unintended consequence. In effect, the 
ambivalent perception has created a paradoxical myth suggesting that Dewey 
supported a traditional approach to social science instruction with stand-
alone subject matter such as his treatment of history and geography in 
Democracy and Education (Fallace, 2009; Saxe, 1992) together with the 
signature interdisciplinary approach to problem solving. As Stanley and 
Stanley (1977) wisely posited nearly 40 years ago, “the resolution of this 
paradox must be sought in the total philosophy of John Dewey” (p. 365).  
 
A Radical Turn in Philosophy 
 Beginning with the earlier Pragmatists such as William James and 
Charles Peirce, Dewey’s Instrumentalism represented a new approach for 
philosophy. A minimum of five traits suggested that this turn was radical, (1) 
accessibility; (2) being as continuous with the natural world; (3) experience 
as the minimum unit of analysis; (4) democracy as an ethical and moral 
ideal; and (5) school reform. 
 Accessibility. The Pragmatists—and especially Dewey’s 
Instrumentalism—liberated philosophy from the rarefied world of 
philosophers and placed it in the hands of the masses. While philosophy’s 
concern has always been to delve into the fundamental nature of knowledge, 
reality, and existence, Dewey insisted that it serve as a tool in human 
experience to solve every day problems. Therefore, philosophy in the widest 
sense possible was a tool for studying, criticizing, and reconsidering a 
perceived problem. While never being the answer, it was a way of casting a 
wider net, examining the issue over a longer time period or contextualizing it 
within an overarching phenomenon, and then evaluating the consequences 
(Dewey, 1929, 1991). 
 Being as continuous with the natural world. In an evolutionary way, 
anything that existed adapted in a changing environment, but on all levels, 
the rates of changes differed (Think about changes within a being and 
changes between the being and the environment). Therefore, Dewey 
characterized existence as a process of ebb and flow, or in metaphysical 
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terms as form and change where stability, ideal matter, and permanence 
established an equal partnership with change, movement, and adaptation. 
Beginning with the Ancient Greeks, philosophy and science were 
synonymous, but with the advent of the Scientific Revolution in the fifteenth 
century, their paths diverged (Ihde, 1993). However, science continued to 
inform philosophy and vice versa. By the time Dewey arrived on the scene, 
the scientific world had blossomed into a cornucopia of new ideas and 
technological wonders. Being deeply affected by Darwin’s evolutionary 
insights, Dewey placed the organism’s experience at the center of his 
philosophical universe, and articulated a metaphysics—meaning the sub-
branch of philosophy concerned with existence, being, and inquiry into the 
forces of nature—as the centerpiece of his system of ideas. Dewey’s 
metaphysics, which by the end of the nineteenth century was also known as 
“ontology,” reflected Darwinian principles with “experience, interaction, and 
possibility,” (Boisvert, 1988, p. 204) or put another way, Dewey envisioned 
all live creatures as continuous with nature (Dewey, 1929). 
 Experience as the minimum unit of analysis. Human beings engaged 
in one long series of continuous experiences or interactions with the world. 
Most of the time, individuals experienced the world in a primitive way, 
meaning non-cognitively. However, when presented with a problem, the 
individual could have an experience, which was cognitive and contained a 
beginning, middle and end. In this scenario, history was important in the 
forward movement of intelligence evaluating future consequences based on 
prior experiences.  
 Dewey’s analysis of how we experienced the world fell into two 
general categories: primary and secondary. According to Dewey, most of our 
experiences were primary with little to no cognitive activity. Individuals felt, 
suffered, enjoyed, or engaged in knee-jerk reactions without any type of 
reflective component. These types of experiences also supplied much of the 
raw material for secondary experiences or as Dewey (1929) stated, “sets the 
problems and furnishes the first data of the reflection which constructs the 
secondary objects.” (pp.4-5).  Thinking was a reconstruction endeavor where 
events in primary experience become objects in secondary experience. In 
secondary experience, a problem commenced the activity and the conclusion 
was tested back in primary experience. Because humans and other organisms 
were adapting in a changing environment—one that was precarious, 
sometimes dangerous, and riddled with obstacles—our phases of experience 
were continuous with nature. Further, by making experience the minimum 
unit of analysis, Dewey dissolved the dualisms that created the dead ends in 
traditional philosophy. 
 Democracy as an ethical and moral ideal. While Dewey clearly 
elevated the individual above all else, a person had a moral and ethical 
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obligation to contribute to the social realm. In other words, the ideal social 
system was democracy where all individuals had the resources and 
opportunities to flourish in her or his unique way. Moreover, each individual 
had a moral responsibility to nurture and enhance democracy so others had 
the chance to flourish as well. The key to this system was communication.  
 Deweyan democracy was about leveling the opportunity playing 
field. Every individual had the potential for growth, which conceptually was 
the same as individual freedom and self-realization. Because every 
individual was unique, she required varying types and degrees of resources 
to reach her potential. As Westbrook (1991) summarized, “Moral democracy 
called not only for the pursuit of worthwhile ends but for the pursuit of these 
ends in ways that enlisted the freely cooperative participation of all 
concerned” (p. 165). Or as Dewey (1916/2007) stated, “A democracy is more 
than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of 
conjoint communicated experience” (p. 68). Despite offering a radical, broad 
interpretation of democracy, Dewey’s primary focus was always on the 
individual and how democracy enriched an individual’s experience (Cremin, 
1959). 
 School reform. Dewey conceived of schools as an extension of the 
home. In a modern and complex world our ancestors developed schools to 
replace the traditional family and tribal roles for socializing young people. 
He placed great faith in schools as the only universal institution that prepared 
youth for community life; as such, schools must be reformed to take into 
account young people’s interests, emphasize manual and practical activities 
and to use the curriculum as a way to develop students’ ability to act 
intelligently in the world, especially through experimentation. Within the 
frame of experience, Dewey was able to dissolve many of the dualisms 
associated with an educational context such as content and method; theory 
and practice; knowledge and skills approaches. The old dualisms became 
unified in an experience. 
 
Deweyan Philosophy in Action 
 We can view the question of whether Dewey supported the social 
studies or a stand-alone social science curriculum as a proxy war for the 
larger cultural conflicts around what the curriculum should be and who 
should control it, a skirmish over the teaching of history that has sometimes 
degenerated into total war for at least the last 100 years. Acknowledging that 
many factions have competed for influence over that time, the two main 
opposing camps today are the social studies approach versus the social 
science approach groups (Evans, 2004; Leming, Ellington, & Porter, 2003; 
Wineburg, 2001).  
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 Key differences between the social studies and social science groups 
include what courses should be offered in schools, the purpose and source of 
the curriculum materials, and the arrangement of the subject matter. While 
the social studies formal curriculum is comprised of social science subjects 
such as history, geography, government, economics, psychology, sociology, 
and others in a traditional sense, it also can incorporate courses such as peer 
mediation, current events or pre-law, among infinite possibilities. Another 
difference is that while the social science approach is more concerned with 
sources of material, the social studies is focused on cultivating student 
interests and engaging in interdisciplinary inquiry across the humanities. 
Another divergence is found in the arrangement of the curriculum, especially 
in the primary grades, where the social studies follows an expanding horizon 
beginning with the young student’s study of family structures and emanating 
out into the wider community and world. The social science advocates, on 
the other hand, propose stand-alone social science and history courses where 
myths and storytelling help captivate young learners (Egan, 1980, 1983; 
Thornton, 2005).  
 The perceived paradox of Dewey’s ambivalence about the social 
studies curriculum in light of his interdisciplinary orthodoxy presents a 
golden opportunity to put Deweyan philosophy into action. Did he really 
support a traditional, social science approach to history and geography 
because he addressed them distinctly in Democracy and Education? 
Situating the problem against a longer time period and the context of 
Dewey’s writings reveals that (1) the problem is illogical, and therefore, the 
paradox is an apparition; (2) Dewey is marginalized in the literature and 
widely misunderstood; and (3) the social studies field is missing out on an 
opportunity to support and enhance the curriculum. 
 
Contextualizing the Problem in Dewey’s Theory of Nature 
 The centerpiece of Dewey’s Theory of Nature was the live creature’s 
experience with the natural world. Ontologically, anything that existed was 
an event, every individual interacted in some way with other things that 
existed; and all natural existences were histories. A human being continuous 
with nature was constantly adjusting and adapting to the vicissitudes of 
nature and striving for peace, harmony, and stability. Therefore, a central 
characteristic of existence was change and stability, and “what something 
‘really is’ is a function of the changes, alterations, and reactions to 
surroundings that it undergoes” (Boisvert, 1988, p. 133). The central purpose 
of schools, according to Dewey, was to socialize young people to adapt in 
this social milieu, which in educational terms meant that all subject matter 
should be used to study current social conditions with an eye for improving 
the future. At the same time, the curriculum became a content and method 
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for enlarging individual experience for succeeding in the world (Dewey, 
1916/2007).  
 Dewey believed that Darwin’s greatest contribution to philosophy 
was his emphasis on flux and change, something that allowed him to criticize 
Greek thought that mainly focused on form or the stable and permanent 
aspects of existence. That is why the Greeks valued art such as statues and 
temples because they conceived of them as representations of an ideal beauty 
that the mind could come to know. The ideal representation also provided 
refuge from a dangerous world. In other words, Greek philosophy was built 
on dualisms akin to an ideal object and a spectator (Dewey, 1929).  
 Dewey turned everything upside down by reframing the 
philosophical questions in an evolutionary way. For him, the object was a 
specific ontological term for something that resulted from an inquiry within 
an experience. In this way, an individual could have an experience with 
aesthetic qualities as a production process rather than come to know ideal 
beauty. In this system of ideas, whether Dewey actually supported the social 
studies curriculum or favored a social science approach to instruction did not 
result in a paradox because the question was not logical in the context of 
Deweyan thought, particularly in light of the formal curricula and the needs 
of neophyte learners (Dewey, 1916/2007). 
 Social studies and history or geography were not mutually exclusive 
enterprises. In fact, all were instruments for enlarging a student’s experience. 
Rather than an either/or question resulting in a paradox, being continuous 
with nature invited the question, “How did they interpenetrate each other?” 
In Deweyan terms, you could not have a social study without tapping into 
our forebears’ experiences about human associations (i.e., history) and their 
interactions with the natural environment (i.e., geography). In educational 
equivalents, you could not have a social studies subject matter without a 
formal curriculum of facts and concepts in history and geography. However, 
teachers had to select and manipulate history, geography, and all traditional 
curriculum in a way that expanded an individual’s experience “to gain in 
power to recognize human connections;” and “to perceive the spatial, the 
natural, connections of an ordinary act” (Dewey 1916/2007, p. 157). 
According to Dewey, this happened most effectively when a skilled teacher 
developed aims, cultivated student interest, and enlisted active occupations. 
Therefore, concluding that Dewey supported a social science approach in 
schools, revealed a fundamental lack of understanding in his Theory of 
Nature. 
 
Misunderstanding the Middle Position 
 Dewey’s Theory of Nature meant that he offered a middle position 
between respecting the traditional subject curriculum and acknowledging the 
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vital role the teacher played in enlarging students’ experiences. Educators 
misunderstood him because he created a novel ontology based on intricate 
multidimensional relationships, and articulated how thinking was rooted in 
these circumstances. In Deweyan thought, history and geography “are the 
information studies par excellence of the schools” (Dewey, 1916/2007, p. 
158). Yet, it would be an egregious and common mistake to conclude that 
Dewey was merely endorsing the subject matter as things to be learned.  
 In ontological terms, thinking of the curriculum as something 
students learned created an unnecessary philosophical dualism that 
emphasized the stable or permanent elements much like the Ancient Greeks. 
In fact, Dewey barely concealed his derision when he also commented, “The 
words ‘history’ and ‘geography’ suggest simply the matter which has been 
traditionally sanctioned in the schools” (p. 158). Furthermore, Dewey 
recognized that the formal curriculum, organized in an adult way, was 
completely alien to how young learners experienced the world. It was up to 
the teacher to bridge the abyss, and the best way to be continuous with 
nature, was to use active occupations. 
 Formal traditional school curriculum was a static, disconnected 
collection of information that only had the potential to enlarge an experience 
with the guidance of the skilled teacher. In nature, humans generated 
knowledge within social activities, and what they deemed culturally 
important, they passed from one generation to the next. For example, Dewey 
often talked about how the sciences emerged from the arts; the physical 
sciences from war, crafts, and healing; math from the removing of all 
existential materials; geography from the physical human connections; and 
history from the social connections throughout time. In other words, the 
curriculum became functional or instrumental when means and methods 
were unified in the learner’s experience. Therefore, Dewey offered a middle 
position where the growth process reconciled the adult aims, values and 
meanings in the formal curriculum with the immature experiences and 
interests of the child (Dewey, 1929, 2007). 
 In experience, teaching and learning were really one transaction 
between the learner and the environment (including the teacher) similar to a 
painter moving a brush while drawing on past experiences and all the 
resources at her disposal to create a painting. First, in continuous 
experiences, humans did not think and then act on it in a physical manner; it 
all occurred in one flow. Second, an epistemology—or theory of 
knowledge—based on experience inherently suggested that humans 
incorporated all of their senses into the process. Third, the development of 
skills and habits became a crucial part of testing and reflecting on previous 
experiences and then predicting future consequences, freeing up the memory 
for new challenges. The stable element or form for Dewey was the relation 
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of means to consequences within an experience. And finally, within the 
confines of evolution, human beings most effectively progressed solving the 
obstacles of life using inquiry (Pring, 2007).  
 The instrumental value of geography, history, and all subjects was in 
relation to the degree of social connections one could make with the 
resources. For Dewey, active occupations offered the best means for bringing 
the learner in direct contact with the social elements. Active occupations 
included gardening, weaving, storytelling, conducting science laboratory 
experiments, cartography, or any of those activities with social aims bringing 
students in contact with crude and raw materials. These materials were 
histories and offered a mode to “gain the intelligence embodied in finished 
material” (Dewey 1916/2007, p. 149). The formal inherited curriculum like 
geography and history were important adult organizations of information, 
and it was up to the teacher, to make the materials relevant to young learners 
and their limited experiences.  
 The effective teacher set the aims, implemented inquiry activities 
incorporating occupations, and helped students discover and discipline their 
interests. Active occupations were the educational equivalent for continuity 
of experiences, and provided the conditions for thinking or intelligent action: 
An experience was an action with an end-in-view, results and an end. The 
end-in-view was to be aware of what completed an ongoing action and the 
willingness to adjust to changing circumstances. All the events and 
consequences of the action were sequential and causal results. An end, 
though, completed the action and led to another. To develop an aim meant to 
use intelligence with an awareness of the end-in-view. A person’s interest 
propelled the action with a purposeful direction of natural impulses like 
curiosity. By framing thinking within an experience, Dewey dissolved the 
dualism of content and method; theory and practice; and the knower and the 
object to be known. Because means and ends were inherently continuous, 
there were no fixed ends and the only goal was more growth with the 
enlarging of experience (Dewey, 1916/2007; Pring, 2007). The entire 
enterprise was based on establishing logical connections between the subject 
matter and the immature experiences of the learners, which has always 
resulted in misunderstanding. 
 
The Marginalization of Dewey and Future Possibilities  
 In this paper, I have attempted to debunk a paradox about whether 
Dewey supported a social studies or social science approach to learning in 
the schools. Instead, I have offered the case that Deweyan philosophy is a 
middle position encapsulated in individual experience. Moreover, I asserted 
that because Dewey was broadly misunderstood, social studies academics 
have only nibbled on the edges of his philosophy, which was also rich with 
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theory. Philosophy can help us address some of the big questions in our field, 
while theories can guide and support courses of action. 
 One obvious sign of this misunderstanding was the marginalization 
of Dewey in the social studies literature. Deweyan thought appeared in three 
general categories from most to least prolific: (1) an individual citation 
usually to support some general assertions like this typical example, 
Specifically, leveraging historical thinking skills, such as recognizing 
multiple perspectives; developing reasoned judgments of historical 
causality, consequence and significance; and facilitating modes of 
documentary inquiry will yield Dewey's vision of Democracy as 
more than a form of government, but of  ‘a mode of associated living, 
of conjoint communicated experience.’ (Swan & Hicks, 2006, p. 144) 
(2) Dewey’s influence and the origin of the social studies (Evans, 2004; 
Fallace, 2009; Lybarger, 1983; Saxe, 1992); and (3) partial Deweyan 
interpretation and analysis (Misco & Shively, 2010; Shaver, 1977; W. B. 
Stanley, 2010; Stanley & Stanley, 1977; Thornton, 2005; Vinson, 1999; 
Wheeler, 1977). In most of these cases however, Dewey was merely an add-
on when he should be the gravitational center. 
 In addition to his Theory of Nature, Dewey provided theories related 
to experience, intelligence, curriculum, ethics, morality, democracy and 
many more. In fact, Dewey was the first philosopher since Aristotle more 
than 2,000 years earlier to conceive of a comprehensive philosophical 
system. Moreover, today most of the research-based publications in the 
social studies merely draw on parts of theories, meaning the social studies is 
highly undertheorized and Dewey offers promise and possibility. We can use 
Deweyan philosophy to address some of the most pressing questions in our 
field. One example is related to technology and learning. 
 Two questions asked in education, in general, and the social studies, 
in particular are, “Why has the spending of billions of dollars on technology 
over the years not resulted in more and better learning?” and “Why do 
teachers report low levels of technology integration in their classrooms?” 
(Beck & Eno, 2012; Combs, 2010; Cuban, 2001; Shively & VanFossen, 
2009; Shriner, Clark, Nail, Schlee, & Libler, 2010; Whitworth & Berson, 
2002). In the Winter 2003 issue of the social studies flagship journal, Theory 
and Research in Social Education, an article appeared entitled, 
“Constructivism as a Theoretical Foundation for the Use of Technology in 
Social Studies” (Doolittle & Hicks, 2003). Although the focus was on the use 
of technology, in every way this article was about developing a more 
coherent theoretical foundation for learning social studies. Essentially, the 
authors conducted a literature review and developed a spectrum of 
constructivist thought reflected in three categories: radical, social, and 
cognitive.  
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 The writers cited Dewey and Vygotsky as the learning theorists for 
the social constructivist perspective. First of all, this was a major step 
forward in marrying theory to the field. Second, the nature of the article 
relegated Dewey (and others including Vygotsky) to these general notions of 
knowledge making that were not particularly illustrative for guiding 
classroom practice. And third, by failing to distinguish Dewey from 
Vygotsky, they diminished the significant contributions of both. In fact, 
belatedly today, Dewey is recognized as an early technology philosopher 
(Hickman, 2001; Ihde, 1990). 
 The beginning of Dewey’s experimental phase signaled a remarkable 
philosophical and theoretical consistency during the remainder of his 
lifetime. Logical conclusions about digital tools and artifacts (DTAs) based 
on his theories of experience and intelligence include, 
(1) DTAs should only be utilized when there are clear connections to 
social studies aims, course goals, and lesson objectives. 
(2) Working with raw materials and first-hand experiences are valued 
over mediated experiences, particularly with young children. 
(3) When engaging students with DTAs, they should already know 
and be proficient with the manual processes underlying electronic 
shortcuts. 
(4) It is not enough to justify the use of DTAs because they are used 
authentically in the larger society, there must also be a clear 
connection established with student interest. 
(5) DTAs embody the most potential for enhancing student learning 
when schools provide them with maximum of freedom and use 
approaching the authentic ideal. 
(6) The student-teacher partnership is essential for identifying student 
interests, providing educative experiences, and avoiding mis-
educative experiences when using DTAs. 
(7) DTAs should be situated in the praxis of social studies as a 
content and method for promoting intelligent action. (Stuckart, 2014, 
pp. 64-66) 
        This is illustrative of complex guidelines in a complex world of flux and 
change. The point is that when situated in Deweyan thought, we can clarify, 
enlarge, and offer new direction, which benefits social studies practice. 
Moreover, the clarification can lead to new research directions because in 
Dewey’s ontology, research and practice are unified in experience. 
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